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Abstract
Small-granularity role based access control offers an effective solution to reduce the damage an intrusion can
cause to your organization. We describe a new dynamic activation of roles, with automatic de-activation if the
role is no longer used. This allows us to further decrease the granularity of roles, and use the roles as input to
an anomaly based Intrusion Detection System. To show how easy it can be to add Role-Based Access Control to
an existing platform, we briefly discuss a simple implementation for a WWW based Intranet.
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INTRODUCTION
More and more organizations are utilizing WWW technology to implement their corporate Information Systems.
Current Intranets and Extranets are generally build using several HTTP based information servers, but may
involve more complex JAVA and CORBA based distributed applications as well. The security implications of
this new trend are almost never seriously considered. The push to leverage the latest technology to stay
competitive is simply too strong, and the general believe is that a good firewall will provide adequate protection
to prevent misuse of these systems from perpetrators from outside the organization.
In reality, the extensive use of WWW based technologies has created many new vulnerabilities [Ruighaver,
1996] and organizations are finding it more and more difficult to protect their corporate systems from Internet
based attacks. In addition, it should be realized that often the more serious, and most costly, intrusions are not
coming from outside the organization. Providing the same, easy to use, interface to all your internal information
systems has made it easier for a disgruntled employee to wreak havoc. Where it used to be, that only a few of the
employees were considered to be in vulnerable positions, now any employee potentially has the necessary skills
and opportunities to try how far he/she can exploit the system.
With the realization that full prevention of intrusions is almost impossible and too costly, research in computer
security is shifting from pure prevention to early detection of intrusions and/or ways to limit the
damage/exposure resulting from such an intrusion. In this paper we discuss an implementation of role-based
access control (RBAC), aimed at providing the security administrator with the necessary tools to achieve both
these goals.
First we will discuss the concept of Role-Based Access Control, followed by a description of our extension of
small-granularity role based access control with dynamic activation and automatic de-activation of roles. Then
we explain the essentials of our anomaly based Intrusion Detection System and show how the combination of
Intrusion Detection and small-granularity Role Based Access Control can help to reduce the exposure of a
system to an unauthorized user masquerading as an authorized user. We conclude with a brief description of a
prototype we developed for use in WWW based Intranets.

ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Password based access control is the most common security service employed to protect the valuable
information on our computer systems. A difficult to guess password [Spafford, 1992] is used to authenticate a
user, after which all access of this user to objects such as files and applications is controlled with an access
control list for that object. The standard access control service used by NT and Unix is called discretionary
access control, as the owner of each object is responsible for assigning its access permissions. Mandatory access
control, as described in the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (Department of Defense, 1985), is
used in situations where security is more critical and assigns all permissions based on a security policy defined
by the organization responsible for the system.
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Role based Access Control (RBAC) [Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992] is often promoted as the next-generation access
control, superceding the inadequate discretionary and mandatory access control [Sandhu et.al., 1994]. The
limitations of these traditional access control services have often resulted in the implementation of additional
security at the application level and RBAC is expected to consolidate the security needs in a single service again.
This would improve the management of security, especially when RBAC is used as a non-discretionary access
control.
The three basic elements of RBAC are roles, users, and permissions. In RBAC a user’s access rights or
permissions are based on the role that the individual user has in the organization (Barkley, Ferraiolo, and
Radack, 1995). A role is assigned to a user based on his/hers authorities and competence to achieve tasks. For
example, an accountant can issue a check, but only a manager can approve it. Organized in this way, RBAC can
ensure that users naturally follow the security policy of an organization.
A role can be considered to be a collection of users with the same permissions. To better manage roles and
permissions, [Sandhu et al., 1996] proposed the use of role hierarchies to provide a natural representation of an
organization’s structure. In figure 3, we give an example borrowed from [Sandhu et al., 1996]. At the lowest
level we have the role of a staff member. Lecturer, tutor and lab supervisor are three different roles in a
University department, each with different access permissions. All three, however, have also got the right to take
up the role of a staff member with its accompanying access permissions. A course coordinator is a more
powerful role, and a course coordinator can also get the role of a lecturer, a tutor or a lab supervisor.
In this example, a role relates clearly to a position within an organization and describes authorities and
responsibilities to fulfil the functions of such a position. Although a user is usually considered to be a human
being, a process such as a mail program, or a peripheral such as a printer, can also be treated as a user.

Course Coordinator

Lecturer

Tutor

Lab supervisor

Staff member
Figure 1: An example of role hierarchies
One benefit of using the role-based access control is that it can assist an employee to fulfil an organization’s
policy. For example, a tutor can not modify final marks but can agree with the students in a tutorial to move a it
to a different time. A lecturer does not need to be able to change the time tabling of the tutorials, which is the
responsibility of the course coordinator.
This simple example also shows the main problem of such large granularity RBAC hierarchies. The RBAC
needs to have an additional mechanism to ensure that a tutor can only change the time of his/her own tutorials
and a lecturer can only change marks in his/her own courses. A further discussion of solutions to this problem,
however, is outside the scope of this paper.
Another issue in the design of a RBAC system is who is authorized to assign roles to users and to create new
roles in an organization. In most cases, RBAC is an extension of mandatory access control and managed
centrally [Ferraiolo, and Kuhn, 1992]. This makes it much easier to encourage users to abide by the security
policy, as it is not necessary to make all users understand the policy. In a collaborative environment, however, it
is inconvenient to use a centralized role-based access control [Jaeger, and Prakash, 1995] and it is suggested that
RBAC in those cases should be able to behave as a discretionary access control. In other words, users should be
able to at least grant access rights to their own objects and maybe also be allowed to create roles.

SMALL-GRANULARITY ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
The best way to prevent information misuse is to restrict access rights to the smallest subset, which is necessary
to achieve a user’s jobs in an organization [Holbein and Teufel, 1995]. Small-granularity RBAC applies this
principle through a further decomposition of a user’s role. Instead of assigning all the privileges of a lecturer to
the lecturer role, we now establish the role of marker, the role of lecture-note author, and as many other roles as
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we can distinguish. Using the same hierarchical role structure as before, the actual permissions of the general
lecturer role are now limited, but a lecturer is allowed to take on the role of marker, etc, when needed (figure 2).

Lecturer

Marker

Lecture Notes
Author

Change
Theatre

Figure 2: Sub roles of the lecturer role in figure 1.
This low level of granularity provides several important protections [National Computer Security Center, 1989]:
1
limits the effects of errors on the part of the user
2
limits the effects of incorrect code which implements the users functions
3
provides some protection against malicious users, in that damage that can be done is strictly contained to
the privileges defined for the current role. This argument can be extended to malicious code, which is
inserted into the user’s functions.
This last point especially, depends on the ease with which a user can take on additional roles. In figure 3 we
show how a RBAC system can allow the user to open multiple sessions, each with a different role. However, if a
user keeps activating more roles, this user will end up activating all of the roles available to him. Hence, such a
user will expose the system to unacceptably high risks.
The most secure solution would seem to be to restrict a user within a single role at any time. A user is not
allowed to directly activate or deactivate roles, but only switch from one role to another one. To make this
system workable, however, one would need to define the roles in such a way that there is no need to switch
forward and backward between two roles too often. Hence, the result would be that the granularity of roles
would increase again.
We propose, therefore, to allow the activation of multiple roles, but with a time limit on each role. Like in a
password protected screen saver, non-activity in a specific role will result in an automatic de-activation of this
role. Additional limits on the maximum time a role can be active, and constraints, on which roles can be active at
the same time, are further mechanism that can be used to limit the damage an intrusion can produce.
To really, significantly, improve the protection that RBAC can offer, we need an additional mechanism to
authenticate the necessity of the activation of a role [Holbein and Teufel, 1995]. However, preventing a user
from accessing a role can be really annoying for that user and may lead to a significant increase in overhead for
IT user support functions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a similar increase has already occurred in
organizations where the powerful but complex Windows NT access control lists are not carefully managed by a
central IT department.

Users

Roles

Permissions

Sessions
Figure 3: RBAC with multiple role assignments.
Even when an RBAC would temporarily prevent a user from accessing roles he does not need, this would only
limit the initial damage an intruder can cause. A patient intruder (or Trojan Horse) can just wait until the
compromised user account does get permission to access more powerful roles. Hence, we suggest that on its own
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small granularity RBAC will offer only limited security and we propose that its applicability is improved when
combined with a suitable Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
While just implementing small granularity RBAC will normally not prevent major damage, a proper modelling
of roles in an organization can be used to slow down an attack and give an Intrusion Detection System more time
to detect and react. To prevent a malicious user or program from doing a lot of damage in a short time, a small
granularity RBAC should put a limit on the number of roles that any user is allowed to activate in a particular
time frame. We believe that limiting the number of simultaneous role activations can often be more important
than preventing access to particular roles. In many organizations there may be no real need to prevent a user
from accessing any of the general-user roles; just let the user decide which roles he/she needs to access, but
make sure you monitor role activation to detect abnormal behaviour.

Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection
An anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) will, as the name implies, attempt to detect anomalies in
data collected from one or more computers (or networks) on the assumption that those anomalies will represent
an actual intrusion [Ruighaver, 1998]. An intrusion is generally defined as “the unauthorized use, misuse or
abuse of a computer system, a definition that is too vague to be very useful when you need an objective measure
of what an IDS is really capable of detecting.
For this paper, we will only consider such intrusions where an unauthorized user is masquerading as an
authorized user. This can occur when you leave your computer without logging out, or when someone has
watched you type in your password. Another common attack, which allows access by an unauthorized user,
occurs when the program you run turns out to be a Trojan horse and executes a series of commands without you
being aware.
In all these cases, the anomaly based IDS needs to be able to finger print the behavior of an authorized user, in
such a way that the behavior of the unauthorized user is immediately recognized as anomalous. Our current IDS
prototype uses a neural network based anomaly detection engine [Tan, 1995] and has been designed to achieve
detection of a masquerading intruders as well as intrusive behavior of the user itself in a traditional Operating
System environment (Unix and NT). As such, it uses the standard system logs to build up a profile of each user’s
behavior, and compares the current behavior with the user’s profile of past behavior.
Even though the real-time aspect of the IDS has imposed some limitations, our prototype has shown that the
resulting profile can provide a reasonable fingerprint of a user’s behavior. However, depending on the
application area of the IDS and the available audit data, the fingerprint may not necessarily be directly related to
the intrusive behavior we would like to detect. Hence, a deviation of the behavior from this fingerprint does not
automatically mean that there is an intrusion.
Although this IDS has proved to be useful when used by the system administrator as a behavioral monitor, the
many “false” alarms make an automatic response infeasible. Ideally, we could cope with this limitation if it is
possible to immediately re-authenticate the user, but that is normally not possible in a password based access
control environment. Asking the user to re-enter his password would open the way for malicious programs aimed
at password capture. So instead, the only acceptable first response to an alarm is to turn on full auditing for this
user.
Another major problem occurs when we try to implement anomaly-based Intrusion detection in a WWW based
environment where the point-and-click interface is prevalent. The user behavior in such an environment is just
not complex enough to provide the IDS with a usable profile for each user. For anomaly based intrusion
detection to be able to work we have to make the environment artificially more complex.
This is where small granularity RBAC can play a major role. One possible source of user behavior can be build
into the role switching mechanism. When a user has multiple roles, it becomes difficult for a user to decide
beforehand on the role he needs. We therefore decided on a role switching mechanism that only activates a role
after the system detects a need for a new role. As there will in general be more than one role that can provide the
necessary access privileges for the user, the system then provides the user with a list of available roles. The user
has to select a role and, by providing this choice we have created an additional behavior that can be used by an
anomaly based intrusion detection system.

A SIMPLE IMPLEMENTATION FOR INTRANETS
There are already several proposed implementations of the role-based access control for Intranets [Tari and
Chan, 1997 and Barkley, 1995], but they do not have dynamic activation and automatic deactivation of roles.
These RBAC systems are also complex designs aimed at distributed applications, and not suited for simple
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Intranets, which often just consist of a few HTTP servers. Another well-known implementation [Kaijser, 1994]
uses a proxy server between the browser and the WWW servers, a solution that in our view generates several
new security risks. We therefore decided to implement our own simple prototype to demonstrate that the
implementation of small granularity RBAC can be achieved on existing WWW servers with minimal effort.
In traditional operating systems, access rights are classified into read, write, or execute. Role-based access
control is not limited to these traditional rights and can consider access rights in a different way, i.e a debit from
an account can be an access right. On an Intranet the most elementary action is accessing a web page. Each page
can contain different information or achieve special actions through forms or Java applets. As each action is
started by requesting a web page, we can simply embed the relationship between roles and permissions into the
web page by specifying which roles are allowed to access that page.
In our RBAC system, access permissions do not have to be kept secret, which allows us to use a simple
implementation. According to the specification of Hypertext Markup Language (Raggett, Hors, and Jacobs,
1997), the purpose of the Meta tag is to provide information about the document rather than the document
content. So, we added a Meta tag to specify the authorized roles. The WWW server now needs to check this
Meta tag with the available roles for a user, before allowing the requested page to be returned to the user’s
browser.
After considering several alternatives for the management of the user’s roles, we decided to start with a simple
solution that stores the current roles, and their expiry times, in a cookie on the user’s browser. Every time a user
requests a page, the cookie is retrieved and the roles are checked. When the access is granted the expiry time is
updated after which the cookie can be returned to the browser. It should be evident that both cookies and data
transfers between the different components are protected by encryption.
To authenticate the user and to enable the switching of roles, we have used a Java applet. Before a user can start
to access the Intranet, he/she needs to connect to a WWW page on the RBAC server. From there, the Java applet
is downloaded to the user’s browser and a permanent connection is established between the applet and the
RBAC server. When a WWW server gets a request for a page and finds that no role is available that matches the
authorized roles for that page, the WWW server contacts the RBAC server to report the need for a role switch.
The RBAC server then sends the names of all authorized roles from this page to the Java applet, and allows the
user to specify the new role. When the authentication of the role switch succeeds, the RBAC server updates the
cookie in the user’s browser, and tells the WWW server to try again.
A further description of the technical details of our implementation falls outside the scope of this paper. It should
be realized, however, that any security service should be protected against direct attacks on the service. Correct
implementation of a security service is just as important as the conceptual design of the security mechanisms
used in the service.

CONCLUSION
Small-granularity role based access control offers an effective solution to reduce the damage an intrusion can
cause to your organization. We described a new dynamic activation of roles, with automatic de-activation if the
role is no longer used. This new mechanism allows us to further decrease the granularity of roles, which leads to
an improved protection of the sensitive information on your systems.
Anomaly based Intrusion detection is a rapidly growing area in computer security, but its application relies on
users showing behavioral patterns that can be used to provide a fingerprint. Unfortunately, the “point and click”
user interface used in current applications is not a good provider of behavioral patterns. Hence, designing and
building in patterns of behavior in an information system, without getting the user annoyed, is essential for a
good anomaly based Intrusion Detection System.
We discussed a role switch mechanism for RBAC, which can be used to provide additional input for such an
intrusion detection system. By providing additional choices for roles, which are all valid, we encourage the user
to create a more complex behavior, making it more difficult for an unauthorized user to emulate the behavior of
an authorized user.
RBAC and anomaly based IDS together form a powerful combination to protect your Intranet from intruders. To
show how easy it can be to add these components to an existing platform, we described a simple implementation
for a WWW based Intranet. This description was not meant to provide you with the full details of our RBACIDS architecture, as we believe the principles are more important than our choice of implementation.
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